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Abstract
We examine a vertically diﬀerentiated duopoly where firms invest in process
and product innovation and then compete in prices under full market cov-
erage. We show that (i) process and product innovation are complements
(substitutes) for the low-quality (high-quality) firm; (ii) the firm which is
initially more eﬃcient invests more than the rival in process innovation; (iii)
if the initial diﬀerential between marginal costs is suﬃciently high, the de-
mand for the less eﬃcient firm is nil and the duopoly equilibrium does not
exist.
Keywords: vertical diﬀerentiation; quality; R&D
JEL: L13, O31
1 Introduction
The analysis of vertically diﬀerentiated market conveys two main messages,
that can be summarised by saying that (i) if quality improvements mainly
hinge upon fixed costs, the number of firms that can survive at equilibrium
with positive profits is finite, and (ii) there exists an incentive for earlier
entrants to fill quality niches starting from the top. Claim (i) is known as
the finiteness property (see Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1979, 1980, and Shaked
and Sutton, 1982, 1983). The existing literature has produced several exten-
sions of the basic model to investigate, inter alia, the relative incentives of
high- and low-quality firms to carry out R&D for product innovation, i.e.,
quality improvement, either cooperatively or noncooperatively (see Beath et
al., 1987, Motta, 1992, Rosenkranz, 1995). The properly dynamic analysis
of innovation in the form of quality improvement, and its relationship with
patentability, has partly put into question the robustness of result (ii), high-
lighting the possibility that entering earlier than rivals may not go along with
an incentive to fill top quality niches, as saving time means saving upon R&D
costs and may ultimately entail that earlier entrants start serving the market
with low-quality goods (see Dutta et al., 1995; van Dijk, 1996; Lambertini
and Tedeschi, 2006).
Notwithstanding the fact that, as casual observation suggests, product
and process innovation very often coexist in firms’ R&D portfolios,1 the
interplay between investments for quality improvement and marginal cost
reduction has been rarely analysed so far, with the relevant exception of Bo-
nanno and Haworth (1998). They examine a vertically diﬀerentiated duopoly
where either the high- or the low-quality firm may choose whether to activate
an R&D project for either process or product innovation. One of their find-
ingds is that, under Bertrand competition, the high-quality firm prefers to
1To this regard, see, e.g., Athey and Schmutzler (1995) and Cohen and Klepper (1996).
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carry out product R&D while the low-quality firm prefers to activate process
R&D. The intuitive explanation for this result is that, all else equal, increas-
ing the high quality leads to an increase in the degree of diﬀerentiation, while
increasing the low-quality yields the opposite.
In the present paper, we further explore the issue of R&D portfolios com-
posed by process and product innovation activities in vertically diﬀerentiated
industries, relying upon a model by Schmitt (2003) as a benchmark. As in
Schmitt (2003), a vertically diﬀerentiated duopoly is investigated, under the
assumption of full market coverage and variable costs of quality improve-
ment. Addidionally, firms are initially endowed with diﬀerent marginal costs
and may invest in both types of R&D. Market interaction takes the form of
Bertrand competition, as usual under full coverage.
Our main findings can be summarised as follows. While both firms al-
ways invest to develop their respective qualities, they drastically diﬀer as to
the relative inventives to carry out process innovation. Indeed, we find that
the highest investment for process innovation is carried out at equilibrium
by the firm characterised by the lowest initial marginal cost, irrespective of
whether such a firm is oﬀering the high- or low-quality product. The ulti-
mate consequence of this fact is that, provided the initial cost diﬀerential is
large enough, then the less eﬃcient firm is driven out of business by the rival
and the duopoly equilibrium does not exist. Additionally, the present setup
allows us to examine the presence of complementarity or substitutability be-
tween diﬀerent activities in a firm’s R&D portfolio. In this respect, quite
unlike the current wisdom on this matter,2 we find out that product and
process innovations are complements for the low-quality firm while they are
substitutes for the high-quality firm. While the first conclusion is intuitive
and fully in line with previous results, the second one is surprising, at least
2See Athey and Schmutzler (1995), Lambertini and Orsini (2000), Lin and Saggi (2002),
Lambertini (2003, 2004), Lin (2004).
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at first sight. However, it can be interpreted on the basis of the attraction
exerted by the median consumer on both firms under full coverage. While
both cost reduction and quality improvement drive the low-quality firm in
the right direction (that is, towards the median consumer), they drive the
high-quality firm in the wrong one (that is, away from the median consumer).
Therefore any marginal cost decrease by the high-quality firm must be ac-
companied by a lower investment in quality upgrading in order to keep the
firm as close as possible to the median consumer.
We also consider the case in which firms cooperate at the process R&D
stage and characterise the optimal investment eﬀort. We discover that only
the most eﬃcient firm invests when they are asymmetric at the outset, while
no investment is carried out when they start from a symmetric position.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The setup is laid out
in section 2. The game is analysed in section 3. Section 4 tackles the issue
in a cooperative scenario. Section 5 contains concluding remarks.
2 The model
A continuum of consumers of mass 1 is uniformly distributed over the inter-
val
£
θ, θ
¤
with θ = θ − 1 > 0 and density equal to one. A generic consumer
identified by a marginal willingness to pay for quality θ ∈
£
θ, θ
¤
is charac-
terised by the indirect utility function U = θqi − pi if the consumer buys,
U = 0 if he/she does not. qi and pi are the quality and price of the product
sold by firm i. The market is supplied by two firms, H and L, that oﬀer
vertically diﬀerentiated products characterised by quality levels qH > qL.We
assume that the market is fully covered, with the consumer who is indif-
ferent between purchasing qH and qL located at bθ = (pH − pL) / (qH − qL) .
Accordingly, market demands are:
xH = θ − bθ;xL = 1− xH = bθ − θ. (1)
3
Production costs borne by firm i = H,L are Ci = (ci + sq2i )xi. This
amounts to assuming that marginal production cost is the sum of a firm-
specific (quality-independent) component ci plus a quality-specific compo-
nent convex in the quality level, sq2i , where s > 0 is a constant parameter
common to both firms. Additionally, firms carry out R&D activities for
process innovation, i.e., the reduction of ci. These activities involve a cost
Γi = γk2i , where γ > 0 and ki is the individual R&D eﬀort. The outcome of
R&D activity is a firm-specific component of the marginal cost equal to:
ci = ci − ki − βkj (2)
where, as in d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), parameter β ∈ [0, 1] mea-
sures the positive externality received from the rival’s investment. In line
with Schmitt (2003, p. 74), we mainly focus on the case cH > cL; however,
for the sake of completeness, we will also briefly examine the opposite case
where cL ≥ cH .
The objective function of firm i is:
πi =
¡
pi − ci − sq2i
¢
xi − γk2i . (3)
Firms play non-cooperatively a three-stage game where the first stage is for
process R&D, the second is for the development of quality and the third
takes place in the price space. In each stage, firms play simultaneously. As
usual, we shall proceed by backward induction to characterise the subgame
perfect equilibrium.
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3 The game
The second and third stage can be quickly dealt with, as they closely reflect
the analysis carried out by Schmitt (2003). Equilibrium prices are:
p∗H =
2cH + cL +
¡
θ + 1
¢
(qH − qL) + s (2q2H + q2L)
3
p∗L =
cH + 2cL +
¡
θ − 1
¢
(qH − qL) + s (2q2H + q2L)
3
(4)
while equilibrium qualities are:
q∗H =
16s (cH − cL) + 3
¡
4θ + 1
¢
24s
; q∗L =
16s (cH − cL) + 3
¡
4θ − 5
¢
24s
. (5)
Note that
q∗H − q∗L =
3
4s
, (6)
entailing that the the degree of product diﬀerentiation is independent of the
firm-specific cost diﬀerential between firms.
Moreover, observe that, on the basis of (2) and (5), one can describe
the interplay between product and process innovation through the following
partial derivatives:
∂q∗H
∂kH
=
∂q∗H
∂ (cH − cL)
· ∂ (cH − cL)
∂kH
=
2
3
(β − 1) ≤ 0;
∂q∗L
∂kL
=
∂q∗L
∂ (cH − cL)
· ∂ (cH − cL)
∂kL
=
2
3
(1− β) ≥ 0,
(7)
that immediately entail the following:
Proposition 1 From the standpoint of firm H (resp., L), product and pro-
cess innovation are substitutes (resp., complements) for all β ∈ [0, 1) . The
two R&D activities are independent within the firm if β = 1.
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The main message conveyed by Proposition 1 is that there exists a syn-
ergy between R&D activities only within the low-quality firm, while boosting
R&D for process innovation is detrimental to quality enhancement (and con-
versely) for the high-quality firm. This fact can be intuitively interpreted in
the following terms. Of course, any increase in productive eﬃciency (i.e., a
decrease in ci) lowers equilibrium price and therefore makes either firm more
aggressive, all else equal. As far as firm L is concerned, it is also obvious
that any increase in the quality level entails a gain in terms of market share:
hence, firm L approaches the median (and average) consumer by investing
in both directions. On the contrary, any quality increase by firm H drives
it farther away from the same consumer. Consequently, the R&D portfolio
of the high-quality firm cannot feature complementarity as this would ulti-
mately entail that firm H’s product might be driven out of the spectrum
of consumers’ preferred qualities. In terms of price eﬀect (which is driven
by marginal costs) and demand eﬀect (which is instead driven by location
choices along the quality spectrum), this boils down to saying that while firm
L is on the “right side” (i.e., below the median consumer), firm H is on the
“wrong side” (i.e., above the median consumer).
Now we proceed to the characterization of the optimal behaviour of firms
at the first stage, where they set R&D investments for process innovation.
Plugging the equilibrium expressions (4-5) into (3), we obtain the relevant
profit functions at the first stage:
πH =
[16s (cH − cL)− 9]2
432s
− γk2H ; πL =
[16s (cH − cL) + 9]2
432s
− γk2L, (8)
where cH and cL are as in (2). From first order conditions (FOCs) we get
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optimal R&D eﬀorts:
k∗H =
(1− β)
£
3γ (9− 16s∆c)− 32s (1− β)2
¤
3γ
£
27γ − 32s (1− β)2
¤ ; (9)
k∗L =
(1− β)
£
3γ (9 + 16s∆c)− 32s (1− β)2
¤
3γ
£
27γ − 32s (1− β)2
¤ . (10)
where ∆c ≡ cH − cL.As a result, marginal costs are:
c∗H =
27γ
¡
3γcH − 1 + β2
¢
− 16s (1− β)2
£
3γ∆c− 2
¡
1− β2
¢¤
3γ
£
27γ − 32s (1− β)2
¤ ; (11)
c∗L =
27γ
¡
3γcL − 1 + β2
¢
− 16s (1− β)2
£
3γ∆c− 2
¡
1− β2
¢¤
3γ
£
27γ − 32s (1− β)2
¤ . (12)
Therefore
c∗H − c∗L =
27γ∆c
27γ − 32s (1− β)2
. (13)
The corresponding profits are:
π∗H =
£
27γ − 16s (1− β)2
¤ £
3γ (9− 16s∆c)− 32s (1− β)2
¤2
144γs
£
27γ − 32s (1− β)2
¤2 ; (14)
π∗L =
£
27γ − 16s (1− β)2
¤ £
3γ (9 + 16s∆c)− 32s (1− β)2
¤2
144γs
£
27γ − 32s (1− β)2
¤2 . (15)
The above expressions are both positive iﬀ γ > 16s (1− β)2 /27.
Using (11-12), optimal qualities rewrite as follows:
q∗H =
9γ
£
3
¡
4θ + 1
¢
+ 16s∆c
¤
− 32s (1− β)2
¡
4θ + 1
¢
8s
£
27γ − 32s (1− β)2
¤ ; (16)
q∗L =
9γ
£
3
¡
4θ − 5
¢
+ 16s∆c
¤
− 32s (1− β)2
¡
4θ − 5
¢
8s
£
27γ − 32s (1− β)2
¤ . (17)
There remains to check payoﬀs’ local concavity and strategies’ stability.
Local concavity is always satisfied since
∂2πi
∂k2i
= −32
27
s (1− β)2 ≤ 0 for all β ∈ [0, 1] . (18)
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As to stability, we have to check the absolute value of the slope of best reply
functions. The equilibrium is stable iﬀ:¯¯¯¯
∂ki
∂kj
¯¯¯¯
=
16s (1− β)2
27γ − 32s (1− β)2
< 1, (19)
holding for all γ > 32s (1− β)2 /27. This can be summarised by:
Lemma 2 While local concavity always holds, stability conditions require
γ > 32s (1− β)2 /27.
The above Lemma is largely in line with the discussion of concavity and
stability carried out by Henriques (1990) about the well known d’Aspremont
and Jacquemin (1988, 1990) Cournot model with process innovation.
We assume that the stability condition is satisfied. Note that, considering
∆c > 0, k∗L > k
∗
H and c
∗
H > c
∗
L always. This is surely true if k
∗
H > 0. However,
k∗H is non-positive for all
∆c ≥ 27γ − 32s (1− β)
2
48γs
; (20)
therefore, in such a range, k∗H = 0. By plugging k
∗
H = 0 into (8) and solving
the optimization problem for the low-quality firm, we obtain:
k∗L|k∗H=0 =
(1− β) (9 + 16s∆c)
27γ − 32s (1− β)2
> 0. (21)
Furthermore, observe the expressions of equilibrium quantities:
x∗H =
3γ (9− 16s∆c)− 32s (1− β)2
2
£
27γ − 32s (1− β)2
¤ ; x∗L = 3γ (9 + 16s∆c)− 32s (1− β)2
2
£
27γ − 32s (1− β)2
¤ .
(22)
As in the case of optimal R&D eﬀorts, also here we have x∗L > x
∗
H always.
Moreover, x∗H = 0 if (20) holds. As a consequence, whenever the duopoly
equilibrium is sustainable, π∗L > π
∗
H , as can be easily ascertained from (14-
15).
Accordingly, we may state:
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Proposition 3 Provided stability holds, the duopoly equilibrium exists, with
k∗L > k
∗
H > 0, x
∗
L > x
∗
H > 0, c
∗
H > c
∗
L > 0 and π
∗
L > π
∗
H > 0, for all
∆c ∈
Ã
0,
27γ − 32s (1− β)2
48γs
!
.
For all ∆c ≥
£
27γ − 32s (1− β)2
¤
/ (48γs) , x∗H = k
∗
H = 0. That is, the
high-quality firm has no demand and carries out no R&D for process innova-
tion (whereby its profits are also nought), notwithstanding the fact that it in-
deed potentially supplies a positive quality level. In particular, from (5), one
can easily verify that, in correspondence of∆c =
£
27γ − 32s (1− β)2
¤
/ (48γs) ,
qH =
θ + 1
2s
; qL =
2θ − 1
4s
. (23)
That is, qL corresponds to the preferred quality of the median (and average)
consumer, while qH is above the quality level that is preferred by the richest
consumer in the market. Moreover, qL also corresponds to the quality that
the low-quality firm would choose if it were appointed the leader’s role at the
quality stage.3 The reason for this result is that any increase in the basic cost
diﬀerential ∆c beyond the critical threshold
£
27γ − 32s (1− β)2
¤
/ (48γs)
cannot further modify qualities since the low-quality firm is already sup-
plying the preferred quality of the median consumer. Any further increase
would immediately trigger leapfroﬃng by the rival.
If one allows for the possibility that ∆c < 0, it can be easily shown that
the results are the mirror image of what previously obtained, with firms
exchanging their respective roles. In particular, the duopoly equilibrium
exists when ∆c ∈
Ã
−27γ − 32s (1− β)
2
48γs
, 0
!
and in this case k∗H > k
∗
L >
0, x∗H > x
∗
L > 0, c
∗
L > c
∗
H > 0 and π
∗
H > π
∗
L > 0. If firm H enjoys an
3For the derivation of the preferred quality of a generic consumer in the interval
£
θ, θ
¤
,
see Cremer and Thisse (1994). For the Stackelberg solution of the quality stage, see
Lambertini (1996).
9
absolute cost advantage over the rival, adding up this element to the fact
that it is supplying the high-quality good entails that firm H is ultimately
outperforming firm L in all respects. Furthermore, it is the only active firm
when ∆c ≤ −
£
27γ − 32s (1− β)2
¤
/ (48γs). In this latter case it can be
easily verified that:
qH =
¡
2θ − 1
¢
4s
, qL =
¡
θ − 2
¢
2s
, (24)
i.e. firm H that supplies the quality it would produce were it appointed the
first mover advantage at the second stage of the game, while firm L’s quality
lies below the lower bound of the interval of preferred qualities.
Lastly, we sketch the case where ∆c = 0, i.e. the firm-specific component
of the marginal cost before process innovation is equal across firms. While it
remains true that at equilibrium firm H produces a good of higher quality
than firm L, and it charges a higher price, demand is equally split between
the firms and each one serves half of the market. Moreover, the investment
eﬀort in R&D is the same for both firms and amounts to:
k∗H |∆c=0 = k∗L|∆c=0 =
(1− β)
3γ
. (25)
Similarly, equilibrium profits are symmetric and equal to:
π∗H |∆c=0 = π∗L|∆c=0 =
£
27γ − 16s (1− β)2
¤
144γs
. (26)
This last result directly derives from the isomorphic structure of our game
with respect to the Hotelling model with quadratic transportation cost, as
demonstrated by Cremer and Thisse (1991). Once firms are symmetric since
the very beginning, it follows that, notwithstanding the equilibrium’s quality
diﬀerence, profits and demands are exactly the same.
To complete the equilibrium analysis, there remains to check the incen-
tives for a firm to leapfrog the rival at the quality stage. In fact, Proposition
10
3 may legitimately raise the issue of whether there exists such an incentive
for the high-quality firm to leapfrog the rival downwards, given that ∆c is
positive and lies in the range where firm H’s market share and profits are
nil. I.e., is there a profitable deviation from q∗H , whereby firm H could indeed
gain by relocating in the range (0, q∗L)?
In order to investigate this perspective, we shall assume that prices are
flexible, as well as the quality level chosen by the high-quality firm. On the
contrary, we keep fixed the quality level of firm L, q∗L in (17) as well as R&D
eﬀorts, k∗H = 0 and k
∗
L|k∗H=0 as in (21). That is, we examine the profitability
of a unilateral deviation by firm H at the quality stage, given (i) the quality
supplied by the rival and (ii) the sunk decisions of both at the first stage.4
In the Appendix we prove the following:
Proposition 4 For all |∆c| > £27γ − 32s (1− β)2¤ / (48γs) , the duopoly
equilibrium does not exist.
Note that, by symmetry, we cover also the case where ∆c < 0 and
the low-quality firm examines the profitability of leapfrogging the rival up-
wards, starting from a situation where k∗L = x
∗
L = π
∗
L = 0 in that |∆c| >£
27γ − 32s (1− β)2
¤
/ (48γs) .
Another related question is the following: is there any incentive to leafrog
in either direction when |∆c| < £27γ − 32s (1− β)2¤ / (48γs)? A simple intu-
itive argument shows that this is not the case. As already remarked, Cremer
and Thisse (1991) proved that with ∆c = 0 the present model is isomorphic
to a spatial diﬀerentiation model with quadratic transportation costs (as in
d’Aspremont et al., 1979). In the latter, if firms are located respectively to
the left and right of the average (and median) consumer, then leapfrogging
is not profitable. Likewise, in the present model of vertical diﬀerentiation,
4This is the standard approach to leapfrogging in vertical diﬀerentiation models. See
Motta, Thisse and Cabrales (1997) and Rosenkranz (1997).
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leapfrogging incentives are absent if both profits are positive and firms are
located respectively above and below the quality which is preferred by the
median (and average) consumer, qM =
¡
2θ − 1
¢
/ (4s) , for the following rea-
son. Suppose first that ∆c = 0. In such a case, leapfrogging by either firm
is not profitable if qL < qM < qH as it is not in the corresponding horizon-
tal model. Alternatively suppose |∆c| ∈ ¡0, £27γ − 32s (1− β)2¤ / (48γs)¢ .
If so, a fortiori, the firm bearing the highest ci has no incentive to leapfrog
precisely because it is less eﬃcient than the rival.
4 R&D cooperation
If firms cooperate at the R&D stage, they can activate either a joint venture
or a cartel. The first case would consist in funding research activities carried
out in a single lab, with firms sharing its cost. The outcome would be a
single technology whereby firms would share the same marginal cost. This
entails that the joint venture would lead us back to the standard Hotelling-
like symmetric model we know from Cremer and Thisse (1991; 1994), inter
alia. If instead firms create an R&D cartel, they coordinate the activities
carried out in their respective labs so as to maximise joint profits. Given
that firms play noncooperatively in the quality as well as in the price space,
the solution of the second and the third stage is the same as in the previous
section. In the first stage, the objective of the R&D cartel is to maximise
the sum of firms’ profits appearing in (8) w.r.t. kH and kL :
ΠC =
[16s∆c− 9]2 + [16s∆c+ 9]2
432s
− γ
¡
k2H + k
2
L
¢
(27)
where superscript C stands for cartel and ci = ci − ki − βkj.
The first order conditions (FOCs) approach yields to the following pair
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of R&D eﬀorts as candidate maximizers of the cartel’s profit:
kH = −
32∆c (1− β) s
27γ − 64 (1− β)2 s
; kL =
32∆c (1− β) s
27γ − 64 (1− β)2 s
, (28)
whereby it is evident that kH and kL have opposite sign, and therefore they
cannot be simultaneously positive. This entails that, in order for the solution
to be economically meaningful, we must impose that, whenever either of the
above expressions is negative, the actual R&D eﬀort of the firm is in fact nil.
A quick exam of second order conditions:
∂2ΠC
∂ki
=
64
27
(1− β)2 s− 2γ ≤ 0; (29)
H =
⎡
⎢⎣
64
27
(1− β)2 s− 2γ −64
27
(1− β)2 s
−64
27
(1− β)2 s 64
27
(1− β)2 s− 2γ
⎤
⎥⎦ (30)
reveals that the necessary and suﬃcient condition for local concavity and
asymptotic stability is γ > 64s (1− β)2 /27. Provided this condition is satis-
fied, we have two opposite cases.
• ∆c > 0, and consequently kH = 0. It follows that the optimal R&D
eﬀort of firm L is:
kCL =
32∆c (1− β) s
27γ − 32 (1− β)2 s
. (31)
• ∆c < 0, and consequently kL = 0. The optimal R&D eﬀort of firm H
is therefore given by:
kCH = −
32∆c (1− β) s
27γ − 32 (1− β)2 s
. (32)
This has the immediate implication stated in the following Proposition:
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Proposition 5 Provided that the condition ensuring local concavity and asymp-
titic stability is met, then (i) if ∆c > 0, kCL > 0 and k
C
H = 0; (ii) if ∆c < 0,
kCL = 0 and k
C
H > 0; (iii) if ∆c = 0, k
C
L = k
C
H = 0.
Summing up, we have seen that R&D cartelisation induces to shut down
the R&D lab of the firm initially characterised by the lowest eﬃciency level.
The entire brunt of R&D activity is borne by the firm whose initial marginal
cost was min {cH , cL} . Moreover, in the special case in which the initial
eﬃciency level of the two firms were the same, then the cartel would be
altogether inactive with respect to process innovation, leading to a joint
profit equal to
ΠC
¯¯
∆c=0
=
3
8s
. (33)
The last point calls for a more detailed explanation, referring in particular
to what we have seen in the non cooperative scenario when ∆c = 0. When
firms compete at the process innovation stage, they invest the same positive
amount in R&D to cut the firm-specific cost. However, this does not provide
a significant advantage for either firm, and indeed equilibrium profits and
demands are the same. This amounts to saying that process innovation
results in a waste of resources, as the symmetric structure of the model
prevents to gain a competitive edge over the rival. When firms form a cartel
and cooperate at the process R&D stage they internalize the inutility of
carrying out such activity and therefore they do not invest at all. It can
be easily checked that ΠC
¯¯
∆c=0
> (π∗H |∆c=0 + π∗L|∆c=0), so that firms would
always prefer to coordinate their R&D eﬀorts.
5 Concluding remarks
We have investigated a vertically diﬀerentiated duopoly where firms may ac-
tivate R&D projects for process and product innovation before competing a`
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la Bertrand on the market. Product innovation is conceived as quality im-
provement. The foregoing analysis has yielded four main results: (i) process
and product innovation are complements for the low-quality firm while they
are substitutes for the high-quality firm; (ii) the firm which is initially more
eﬃcient than the rival does invest more than the rival in process innovation;
(iii) if the initial diﬀerential between marginal costs is large enough, then
result (ii) ultimately entails that the less eﬃcient firm has no demand and
the duopoly equilibrium does not exist; (iv) when firms cooperate at the pro-
cess R&D stage, we find out that only the most eﬃcient invests when they
are asymmetric, while no investment is carried out when they start from a
symmetric position.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 4
The new demand system is defined as
xL = θ − eθ ; xc = eθ − θ (34)eθ = pL − pc
q∗L − qc
where subscript c stands for leapfrogging. The relevant objective functions
at the third stage are:
πL = (pL − c∗L − sq∗L)xL
πc = (pc − cH − sqc)xc
(35)
where the marginal costs of firms are determined by their R&D eﬀorts k∗H = 0
and k∗L|k∗H=0 , so that the leapfrogger bears cH . Candidate optimal prices are:
p∗L =
2c∗L + cH +
¡
θ − 1
¢
(q∗L − qc) + s
¡
2 (q∗L)
2 + q2c
¢
3
p∗c =
c∗L + 2cH +
¡
2− θ
¢
(q∗L − qc) + s
¡
(q∗L)
2 + 2q2c
¢
3
(36)
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As a result, the profits of the leapfrogging firm are
πc =
£
c∗L − cH + (q∗L − qc)
¡
2− θ + s (q∗L + qc)
¢¤2
9 (q∗L − qc)
(37)
which seems to be positive. However, in order to verify whether the r.h.s.
of (37) is indeed positive, we have to check whether xc > 0. Using (17), we
have:
xc =
£
3
¡
4θ − 11
¢
+ 8s (2 (cH − c∗L)− 3qc)
¤ £
3
¡
5− 4θ
¢
+ 8s (2 (cH − c∗L) + 3qc)
¤
72
£
3
¡
4θ − 5
¢
+ 8s (2 (cH − c∗L)− 3qc)
¤
(38)
where the denominator is positive for all
qc <
16s (cH − c∗L) + 3
¡
4θ − 5
¢
24s
. (39)
Now note that the above condition is surely satisfied as the r.h.s. expression is
equivalent to q∗L in (5). Consequently, xc and πc are positive iﬀ the numerator
of xc is positive. In order to verify this, observe that
3
¡
4θ − 11
¢
+ 8s (2 (cH − c∗L)− 3qc) ≷ 0⇔
qc ≶ 16s (cH − c
∗
L) + 3
¡
4θ − 11
¢
24s
≡ qc1
(40)
and
3
¡
5− 4θ
¢
+ 8s (2 (cH − c∗L) + 3qc) ≷ 0⇔
qc ≷ 3
¡
4θ − 5
¢
− 16s (cH − c∗L)
24s
≡ qc2
(41)
with both qc1 and qc2 smaller than q∗L in (5) or, equivalently, the r.h.s. of
(39). Therefore, irrespective of whether qc1 > qc2 or the opposite,
xc, πc > 0∀ qc ∈ (min (qc1, qc2) ,max (qc1, qc2)) . (42)
Obviously, once the deviating firm, that was previously the high-quality sup-
plier, has leapfrogged the rival downwards, the latter has a strict incentive to
16
reoptimise. In so doing, the former low-quality firm can indeed exploit the
fact that now it has become the new high-quality supplier and enjoys an ad-
vantage w.r.t. the relative size of marginal costs, as now we have that∆cc < 0
and yet |∆cc| >
£
27γ − 32s (1− β)2
¤
/ (48γs) . On the basis of Proposition 3,
once firm L has reoptimised its own quality, the leapfrogger is left with zero
demand.
17
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